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The mix of unpredictable bug bounty with stable pentesting can give you a really good balance

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and while I talk about bug bounty a lot, in this video we'll talk about pentesting, how

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to become a pentester, how to find clients for pentesting and of course the pentest methodology.

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My guest today is Christy Vlad, enjoy.

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So hello Christy, thank you so much for joining me in today's podcast.

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For those of you who don't know you, can you please tell us a bit about your background

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and where are you currently at?

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Sure, definitely.

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Hi Greg.

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So I'm going to probably try to be short because and I'm trying to catch the essence.

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So formally or by education I haven't followed like or I don't think that most of or a lot

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of the people in cyber security have not started via an educational or an education in cyber

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security background and I actually I'm a civil engineer by education so I did a bachelor's

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and a master's in civil engineering, construction engineering and about eight or nine years

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ago so I didn't actually work in the field because as I was still studying my interests

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have changed.

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So while I was doing my master's my interests have changed so about eight or nine years

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ago I started getting into Python and that also a little after that I became interested

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in cyber security.

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So that's how it all started, Python cyber security then I started doing some for a very

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short period of time I did some challenges.

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There was there was VulnHub back then you had to I guess it probably is you had to you

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had to install the Vulnerable Machine on your system and actually try to get into it.

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Yeah, it was a very difficult part when you had to install the machine and configure the

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network properly to access it from Verve.

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Yeah that was a very short period for me.

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And then another very short period was when Hack the Box started all out so I was on Hack

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the Box ever since it started but I was there only for a short period of time maybe a couple

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of months did a bunch of machines there and then I tried as I can remember now I believe

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I tried to get into the field like into the real world as soon as possible I didn't want

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to waste not necessarily waste I didn't want to spend time in in the theoretical realm

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like on the side I wanted I wanted to actually see how things work in the real world so yeah

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I guess I guess this is a very short intro but you can ask whatever follow-up questions

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you have.

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Yeah so tell me how did you start with with bug bounty and pentesting what was first?

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It was pentesting yeah pentesting.

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I think I started with that more on there was an opportunity locally here and I actually

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followed that opportunity I worked with the company with the local company here doing

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their cybersecurity thing and that was in in their offices that was for a couple of

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months back in 2018 I guess 2017-2018 and that's that's how it all started I saw how

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things work in the real world and after that became after that came other opportunities

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most of them have been online so yeah most of them

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100% of them have been online as far as I can tell.

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Yeah and how did you then get interested in bug bounties?

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I guess I started hearing about about bug bounties 2019-2020 I don't even actually

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remember exactly I think I think that when I took my OSCP yeah so I can look at that

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certificate it's 2019 as I got the OSCP the very same month I believe it was August 2019

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the very same month I started doing some some program online I learned about the platforms I

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learned about back then HackerOne and BugRoute were the the go-to but I didn't spend time on

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those platforms and I think I focused as far as I can remember I focused finding programs on

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Google using the self-hosted ones yeah and then then I focused on getting into SYNAC and that's

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actually how I believe it was 2020 or 2019 when I got into SYNAC that that's where my focus went

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but I didn't do a lot of bounties and I'm not doing I don't spend a lot of time on bug bounties

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yeah for right now from what I know you you focus much more on on pentesting these days

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yeah I mean it could be 90% pentesting so that's that's the majority of my working time 90%

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pentesting and maybe 10% or less in bug bounties and I mean I'm focusing on only one program and

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one platform right now I'm I'm solely on integrity like 99% of my bug bounty time is on integrity

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one program and then the rest of one percent is divided into all other programs on all other

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platforms so it's non-significant and it's not a bad it's not a bad deal that you just have one

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program that you come back to you're probably the expert of it and I imagine you just like

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like hacking there yeah so looking back in I started looking into this program in 2023

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and I actually have a have a list where I keep all my submissions and I sent about

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70 or 80 70 something 70 submissions to the program this year a lot must be huge

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yeah and I mean I love it I love I love their product it's um it's I don't know it it just

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feels right yeah yeah that's great and about pentesting are you are you employed are you a

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freelancer how do you how do you do pentests so I operate as a business I'm not employed

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um I'm not a freelancer so it's uh I actually have collaborators I have other businesses that

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I work with I have main collaborators that I've been working with for about two or three years

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now so they they bring all the most of the I mean the majority of the pentests are brought by them

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so I don't have to worry about going to people but there are people that approach me so those are the

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the majority of as I said the majority of my pentests come from my main collaborators but

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there are others that people approach me okay on on twitter on linkedin and then those are

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those are also part of the of my main work okay so isn't this freelancing because you said you're

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not a freelancer to me it sounds a bit like freelancing well I don't like to maybe that

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part of it but I don't like to call myself a freelancer because I think the the long-term

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collaboration that I have with this uh with these businesses and the fact that they actually

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in freelancing you don't know when you have I think that in freelancing you don't know

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when you have the next project how long is it going to last but in what I do I have sort of a

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certain certainty that I'm going to have ongoing work so I don't have to worry about that okay

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okay fair enough um so you told me yeah I'm indeed naming I'm not not really strict about

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naming things uh anyway but you also told me that people approach you on linkedin on on twitter

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uh why do people approach you and and how can people how other pentesters can also attract

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people to approach them about pentests well there's a very from my perspective I think

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it's a very clear answer to this people approach when they see that you know something

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so oftentimes I post about stuff I'm quite active on twitter and also on linkedin basically posting

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the same things on both platforms so I actually post about stuff that I'm doing so other people

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actually see maybe connections on linkedin that are managers or own companies they see

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that I post stuff about pentesting findings um all that stuff and they actually approach me if

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if I want to look into their um their assets for example their apps their infrastructure

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so it's about sort of like

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establishing presence establishing solid presence on platforms I that's also due to my youtube

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channel back in the days I used to post my videos on these platforms and people will look at the

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videos and approach me due to the videos they saw that I know something and they wanted to

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see if I can help them in one way or another yeah so so basically you just put yourself out there

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and you show people that uh basically what you do so if if someone watches us who maybe just

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starts learning cyber security and they feel like they would like to be out there and show

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show things to people but they they kind of feel that they cannot do it because they cannot

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they do not know enough in this case if someone is actually you know just learning cyber security

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do you think they can still put something out there to the internet to see

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yeah definitely let's take for example I don't know maybe their learning journey

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maybe they're at the very beginning of their learning journey they're using a platform like

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try hack me hack the box or whatever other platform web security academy they could simply

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post about hey look I went through this challenge on I went through this uh learning path on web

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security academy I did this exercise and I learned this they could do a short post maybe on linkedin

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or on twitter or they could write something on medium or substack or whatever other platform

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write about their experience and then post it out there do that multiple times and people are

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going to start coming to you yeah and you also mentioned here a lot of platforms you mentioned

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twitter the substack the blog post how do you think they should choose on which platform to

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post up or maybe they should also do a youtube video definitely I mean youtube brought me a lot

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of opportunities so but you know most people are actually more comfortable writing something

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than starting to put themselves out there when I first started doing youtube videos back in 2015

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I did videos on python and on AI and only afterwards I began doing cybersecurity videos so

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it's it's not easy to start on youtube you it's it's and a significant portion of people in

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cybersecurity are geared towards introversion so I don't think it's easy especially if you

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account for that but to get back to your question doing posting on one of these

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blog platforms I'd say medium but you have to be careful because on medium if you want to reach a

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broader audience you should not be tempted on choosing their monetization for your for your

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writings because if you do that most people or a lot of people from my experience as a reader on

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medium are not actually going to be able to read your stuff because it's only going to show a short

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chunk from the video and if you want to read more you'll have to pay one dollar on medium per month

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and a lot of people aren't willing to pay one or ten or however their subscription is make sure you

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opt out of their monetization. Even if it was one cent people will just not add their credit card

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it's not worth it. Paywalling is paywalling. Yeah it's not worth it. For now Substack is free

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from what I know. Medium is also so I actually opted out of the the monetization on medium

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and whatever I post on there it's anyone can read right now maybe they'll change this in the future

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but yeah put yourself out there and do it frequently that's probably the gist of the question.

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Yeah and speaking maybe more specific about the resources what do you think would be a good

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learning path if you wanted to get into cyber security today as a 20 something year old computer

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science student? Depending on what you want to focus on so you mean as a bug bounty hunter?

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Well the problem is that the hypothetical person we are talking about doesn't know this yet.

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Exactly so that's when you have platforms like for example TriHackMe with their very introductory

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paths learning paths there's pre-security I guess there's a intro to cyber security

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that's where you get exposure with the multitude of careers or subfields in cyber security that

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you could pursue. I would go with that to actually get a bit of clarity on where I want to move

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because cyber security is a very very large field today so it's not it's not all about pen testing or

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bug bounty hunting there's there's a lot of stuff that you can do so start with getting clarity on

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who you want to be in the field afterwards it's afterwards I mean it's more simple.

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Yeah that's a that's a great answer and let's let's come back a little bit to to pen testing

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and to finding clients so let's say that all the clients that you have that you are working with

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just leave you today from just write you an email today you didn't work together anymore

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how do you find clients for 2024?

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Well exactly how I told you a few moments ago so I would actually maybe I would focus a little bit

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more on bug bounties not maybe probably I'll probably focus a little bit more on bug bounties

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and actually post about my findings and I'm pretty sure that if I if I grow a network on LinkedIn

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if I grow a network on LinkedIn and on on mostly on LinkedIn probably

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people are actually going to start asking me questions not only so it's very likely that I'm

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only going that I'm going to be approached by other people who want to become or become better

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in cyber security so other pen testers but I'm also going to be approached by by potential

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businesses potential interest potential interesting or interested clients that's

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what I would do I would actually do bug bounties and then have an ongoing stream of posts about my

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findings. Yeah that definitely seems like a like a winning strategy have you tried

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I wouldn't go about the formal route such as applying to companies applying to I wouldn't do

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that I would not apply or send jobs or send resumes on on LinkedIn because it's very likely that you're

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it's very unlikely that you're gonna get in in front of the person that makes decisions

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you want the person that makes decisions approaching you not you trying to approach

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them because if you try to approach them if you try to approach a business that's

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hiring pen testers you're first probably gonna encounter HR people a lot of them are not very

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experienced in cyber security and cannot actually assess or evaluate what you can do afterwards if

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you pass the HR you're gonna have multiple rounds of interviews it's probably not the best

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it's possible but it's probably not the best the path that you want to to follow you want people

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to come to you that's that's because you're in a position of good negotiation if people come to you

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you can operate on your terms let me let me know know your your your thoughts about this because

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you're you're from Romania I'm from Poland these are countries with relatively lower cost of living

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and also lower earnings than for example US and from I'm obviously not actively pursuing a job

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now but when I did I felt like when you just send a resume to a company even if it's like

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even if it's like a global remote company like GitLab the salary they're going to offer you

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will be comparable with other salaries in the same country so let's say a Polish salary which

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is probably like twice to half of this which what you can get in US and if you want to get a salary

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from a country like US or Germany or whatever I feel like the only way to do it is by networking

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and by by approaching people directly definitely so I can see this it's probably normal and common

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sense for for companies to offer salaries based on your position but like I said earlier it's

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since you're in the negotiations you want first of all you want to position yourself you want to

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see yourself as a global player here yeah so you you you should probably see yourself as a

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global entity global person and maybe maybe you want to set yourself or maybe you want to have

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expectations of course depending on your skills because if your skills are good if you have good

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skills you can ask whatever you want it this doesn't mean that you're going to get whatever

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you want you have to have some common sense because if like the median global range for a

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pentester starting could a good one would be $50 an hour you wouldn't want to ask $250 an hour

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because nobody's going to give that to you you have to know first of all you have to know the

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industry and I believe that a very large portion of cyber security people aspiring and actual

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pentesters don't know their worth and don't know the exact industry right now this could be probably

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due to the fact that not everyone is transparent on how much they make numbers are not quite public

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some of them are but you do get a feel for for how much a certain person with a certain

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year of experience is worth so if someone comes to me if a company approaches me and

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asks or says that they can pay $30 an hour or $20 an hour because they know that would be a good

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money so I'm hypothetically speaking because they know that would be good money for Romania

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I'm just going to say no thank you and it depends on how the conversation goes afterwards

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if if they're just looking for someone to fill a position they're actually going to keep looking

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but if there's someone who's actually interested in me personally and there is that situation as

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well we've seen examples of of companies that want a certain type of person on them like for example

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I think moving a bit from cyber security I think that and most people are not going to

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know the name I think that OpenAI pursued Andrew Karpathy who's who's a very big name in in AI

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to to go back to OpenAI after it had left a couple of years ago because

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they knew he this person was worth whatever he was worth so the company pursued a specific person

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an individual into their company so it depends it's very contextual

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yeah yeah I also didn't didn't know this name I admit and uh I suspect a lot of our audience

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as well but but yeah that's true and that's that's a really good position like sometimes

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we talk about maybe negotiation strategies and things like this but it always starts from a point

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where you position yourself before the negotiation even even begins and and as I said like the

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differences here in your positioning can have much greater impact than you you know negotiating

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10 percent more than than someone else with worse negotiation skills can get exactly so you have to

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know where you stand what is your skill level and what are your expectations what are your real

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expectations and also what are the expectations that could be

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seem or deemed as reasonable by the other party so you could say that you're worth hundred dollars

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an hour for example for a pen tester but the majority of the companies approaching you think

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that you're only worth 40 an hour so you have to actually understand whether or not they are right

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or you are right or where or whether or not the truth is somewhere in the middle so very contextual

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yeah yeah so let's assume we already have a client for a pen test uh can you talk me

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through the whole process from the initial contact to the to what happens after the pen test

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yeah so of course you have the scope the client tells you exactly what they want most of them know

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because you're not actually talking to um or in my experience i'm not actually talking to the owner

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of the business unless the owner approaches me it's a small company or the owner approaches

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me on linkedin and wants me to look into their stuff but for the majority of pen testers

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you're actually interacting with another person and not another cyber security people person from

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their company or maybe a technical manager or maybe a developer or someone who actually has

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an idea of what they want they give you the scope they tell you we want to test this app strictly

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and you you want to make sure that you specifically understand the scope

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so that you're always on the target afterwards once you establish the scope of course there's

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contract there's the contract there's all the paperwork that needs to be done which in most

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cases i don't deal with uh with all the papers my collaborators do my collaborators and the client

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okay but there are there are a significant number of situations when i have to deal with everything

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especially when clients actually approach me so this regarding the paperwork once you have the

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scope you're actually the scope and the duration of the pen test of course you have established

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the pricing for the pen test you usually i mean this is very this is very customizable

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there are many situations with when companies say we only have this budget for pen testing

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what can we do with it and you having experience from other pen tests knowing how much your time

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is worth you can say well look we could do this for that amount of money so it often goes like

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that because not all the companies have unlimited budgets for cyber security even though that even

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though i feel that it's still an overlooked area and we can see leaks data breaches happening every

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day we can see ransomware every day going rampant so people companies businesses are not paying

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enough attention to to cyber security but to get back to the main point you establish the price

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the scope the duration you test you write a report you deliver it to the client you actually

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it often involves ongoing back and forth clarifications oftentimes check their fixes

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and of course if you have a business oriented perspective you want to over deliver

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and under promise so that the client comes back to you at a later time

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okay and how to make the process before when the appendix is already when you're already talking

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with a client how to make this process smooth of like giving credentials creating the environment

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because from my experience back back when i worked it was always a problem with credentials

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and everything and it caused delays and it was always very difficult yeah exactly

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so that's uh that's still a problem um whenever we get new clients um

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that's one of our first requirements is this i mean are we talking about an application with

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multiple roles with accounts with can we uh get the accounts ourselves uh can we self-register

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do we need to pay to actually test everything thoroughly you need to provide us with the

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premium plan with an account on the premium plan on the enterprise plan you you have to provide us

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with multiple roles give us everything that we need to test that's probably one of the first

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requirements that we have for everyone so accounts working accounts a lot of times

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not maybe not a lot of times but oftentimes we are provided with accounts that are not working

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or not have been set up properly so there's a little bit of back and forth in the beginning

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when it comes to testing roles and permissions but that's one of the first things that that you

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have to to establish do you use some templates some checklists for this part of the process

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well actually yes so um

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um first off is the web security testing guide by oas the checklist i actually i recently

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um made a version of it made what i think it's an optimized version of it and i posted it on github

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is a checklist it's a checklist with about 130 items on it it's as its name says web security

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testing guide it's actually quite comprehensive oas are very quite on point with uh their their

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stuff with the api security with the web security uh these are go-to so for someone who's starting

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in pentesting and doesn't have any colleagues to actually guide them how it all works um

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these are starting points these are documents that you want to have with you at all times for

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all the pentests that are specific to web apps and api stuff um but of course throughout the years i

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have my own i've developed alongside these i have my own methodology where i actually

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usually know where to look for and what types of vulnerabilities are most encountered

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and are of quite high impact okay and so we have oas testing guide that's definitely

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something to recommend for people do you also use other checklist or other documents by oas

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no so it's just the web security testing guide i don't actually they might have methodologies for

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i don't know maybe infrastructure testing they also have the mobile application the mspg the

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mobile security testing guide i do know of it i i actually referenced it or reference i'm

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referencing it a lot uh when i test mobile apps but uh it's not as a first-hand reference document

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as vstgs for example and the one involving api security and of course there are also there's the

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the the cheat sheet series by oas which is really really good all in one website these are very good

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uh go-to um references of course there's also the hack tricks book which is really good

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so as as a as someone who's working in in pen testing as a pen tester

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um these are some of the documents that i use myself okay okay these are great people

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save these because these are really really good resources for me also when i'm testing uh some

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vulnerability one of the first resources that i go to is is hack tricks to to see copy the basic

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payload see other references and stuff like this so it's really really really good and and really

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big as well like the amount of of information that's there on different uh different topics

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because it's not only web vulnerabilities i think there's now also cloud there are different ports

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described is really really extensive it's all in one place yeah yeah okay so what are the most

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common findings that you encounter during pentests okay so um probably the most encountered are low

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hanging fruits such as

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user enumeration um

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issues with cookies

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um session tokens not being invalidated overexposure of information these are the low

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hanging fruits like server headers and all that stuff these are i mean you could put these in a

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pentest in a report but you nobody's going to accept this as a finding in a bug bounty program

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these are all out of scope unless you somehow show impact that they they could negatively affect

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the asset or the company or the business so but these are actually relatively valid findings

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on pentests but of course these are the most common findings you don't want to focus

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on these because you want to deliver good work so most of the the findings most of the impact

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findings that i have have to do with broken access control authorization authentication issues um

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authentication bypass other bypasses these that impact people that actually have an impact on the

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underlying infrastructure there's also i see a lot of um ssrf there's there's a lot of i see a lot of

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ssrf in my findings i also see there's still xss i don't actually at in bug bounty hunting i don't

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look for xss but in pentesting i find xss and i also find xss even in apps that actually use

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frameworks so it's hard to explain i cannot even explain to myself why i why this was there for

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example so xss is still present i don't like it but it's still there um injection other injection

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issues a lot of stuff that has to do with business logic business logic is um where you actually have

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to understand what the application is meant to do and how can you make it do something that is not

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been meant to do with an impact with a security impact this is probably one of the types of

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vulnerabilities that's gonna be long there even in the age of ai because it's you cannot find it

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with scanners you cannot find it with automation you have to think through the entire process

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for example the authentication flow something might be disrupted there um and if you actually

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look at it closely try to understand it you you you'll probably find something that's

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not working as intended also rate um rate limiting stuff these are these could be high or low impact

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i've seen instances where we're bypassing rate limits has had high impacts for example when

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there's a multi-factor authentication you get a code and that code is brute forcible that's high

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impact issue because if you're able to brute force uh the mfa for any account it's account takeover

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so it's it's still the wild west there yeah it's something that as a

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inex inexperienced pentester i thought about the rate limiting bug as a lame vulnerability class

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but but yeah in the context of otp it's basically an account takeover so we also

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have seen bounties of i don't know 20 or maybe even 50 000 for for those and i'm not surprised

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and i also definitely agree with the thing you said about the business logic bugs

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like many vulnerability classes will probably be fixed with time with better scanners because i

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don't know sql injection is very easy to fix by look just spots by looking at the code and then

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by fix even automatically uh but xss i think has many contexts and that's probably the reason why

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it's still so prevalent but still the number of of context is limited and scanners do get better

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over time but i think authorization bugs eidos business logic bugs they do require the context

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and it's very difficult to for a scanner to understand this context so i think these are

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vulnerabilities that that if people learn they will just uh be more and more impactful over time

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as the general number of vulnerabilities i hope will will go down

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yeah i mean but we still we also still hope that we will have some work to do in the future as well

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so if the number goes down we have to find other ways that we can position ourselves

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valid as valued assets in the entire ecosystem of the business for example i don't think that

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over the long term um all cyber security issues are going to be fixed by ai or by something else

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because there's also there's always the human component where things go wrong we can see this

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with all the breaches that occur on an ongoing basis where credentials are leaked

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high impact credentials are leaked for example from a developer or from

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from someone even in the context of for example github having all sorts of

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checks and implementations on their platform when when people deploy code there are still

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leaks occurring and i think this is going to be quite hard to prevent unless we put everything in

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in the hands of ai which i don't think that's actually doable in the near

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at least in the near future yeah probably not

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speaking of uh do you use ai during your your hacking

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yeah so i used it a lot i actually use it quite extensively when it comes to

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minute stuff such as scripting prepping one-liners uh i used to before chad gpt4

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because i don't think chad gpt 3.5 is decent i don't think it is decent but chad gpt4 is quite

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good and it actually understands what you want even if you cannot express it yeah exactly what

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you want you put in some you put in something there half a request and it actually understands

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what you want or at least that's what my version of chad gpt4 with my system prompt

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uh is actually doing for me so i use it a lot when it comes to scripting one-liners bash stuff

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um it's saving me tremendous amount of time because it actually took maybe one two three

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hours for example in the past when i had to do something custom and i would actually have to

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look into stack overflow see what other people did adapted to my own personal situation and uh

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so now it's it's a matter of 30 seconds to two minutes maybe at most until i get the answer

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yeah yeah it definitely saves a lot of time how about regular tools uh normally in when

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when we're talking about bug bounties i don't even ask about automatic scanners because i don't

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believe that that they are worth uh even if they can find something i it's probably a duplicate

348
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but in context of of pentesting uh do you use any scanners

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scanners no i don't use scanners nothing no so uh i mean the go-to i used to be the bug i used to

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be the recon guy back in when i started looking into bug bounties but i'm actually doing maybe

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for example specifically for bug bounties maybe i do 10 percent of my scanning is recon

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and only with the purpose of increasing the attack surface this should be i just had this

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thought a few days ago the whole purpose of recon and i have a recon course that it's free on

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youtube now uh the whole purpose of recon should be to increase the attack surface and not actually

355
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to find bugs there might be people who actually keep finding bugs with recon but the majority of

356
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them are not so the whole purpose of recon i think it should be to increase the attack surface

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now when it comes to pentesting uh i mean the tool that i use the most is burp suite so

358
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for example web stuff web apps that's burp suite that's uh

359
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probably paid it's burp suite probably paid or my findings with burp suite probably paid

360
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its investment it's pro version multiple times over so it's probably is one of the

361
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best investments ever so it's all burp suite yeah what are your favorite burp extensions

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authorize what else own fox what's that it's a colorizer for sessions for example if you're

363
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using firefox with multiple containers each container has its own color in burp history

364
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and it's actually it's very useful when you're testing for different roles and permissions

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so authorizing combination with own fox and uh multi containers in firefox

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this is this is a very good combination i i tested other um

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extensions but i usually spend my time in the repeater and analyzing uh

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the stuff with these three with this uh this environment of the three the three extensions or

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the two extensions that that i told you about i looked into minor plugins for example jazz miners

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that actually grab endpoints but but i rather actually spend my time um looking into the code

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myself instead of having a parser go through the jazz file because if i'm looking into the code

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myself i can actually understand stuff i can actually maybe understand the logic behind a

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function and it's that's something that no extension or tool is going to unless you plug the

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entire uh the entire code into chat gpt or some ai uh but i don't think it still can it can still

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keep the entire context and give you good findings for example an ai tool that's that's

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why i choose to do it manually going back to the extensions i think that there's also the graph ql

377
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um there's a graph ql extension you can remember from the top maybe right there

378
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it i think so which adds uh adds a tab to to all the requests where you can actually

379
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better edit

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uh better edit the graph ql request for example

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yeah these are this is the cream so to speak of uh extensions yeah yeah okay and you also told

382
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me before that you do some mobile hacking mobile hacking or mobile pandas thing what's your setup

383
00:47:18,160 --> 00:47:24,800
for this yeah well the setup is a bit more complex so you have to have a

384
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i do so in the in in the bug bounty program that i'm working on that i've been working on in 2023

385
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they also have an app a mobile app and luckily i can test it on my own device

386
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uh because it doesn't have um it's made for testing it it doesn't have ssl pinning

387
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and i can test it on my non uh rooted phone okay but it usually involves having an emulator for

388
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example i also have an iphone for testing uh iphone apps i've tested iphone apps uh in the past

389
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um so the testing usually involves an emulator for example like it used to be jenny motion but

390
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i think it's very heavy in terms of and non-convenient for example right now it's nox

391
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so nox it's um it's really good really easy to set up nox you have to have installed adb

392
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um to be able to bridge between uh your laptop there's of course there's frida

393
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so the setup is comprised of nox frida

394
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your laptop of course and bird suite this is for dynamic testing

395
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so when you're testing actually the communication

396
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of the app with the api because it usually involves the communication with an api

397
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of course there's also uh looking into the code itself decompiling the app for this

398
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for example you can use apk studio which is a gui graphical user interface tool that you can

399
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decompile the app try to get the sources and look into the code itself sometimes the the

400
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app is obfuscated and it's not as straightforward but it usually works um so then you have that

401
00:49:43,120 --> 00:49:52,880
component you also have to look into the device security itself so how is the um how is the

402
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information or the data stored on the device itself where is it stored is it stored in plain

403
00:50:00,560 --> 00:50:08,720
text you usually look into the data folder the name of the app you look into the shared preferences

404
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inside the shared preferences there's also leak stuff there's also the cache folder in in the

405
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app folder there is also the database folder the files folder that has to do with uh

406
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uh if you look into mstg mobile security testing guide it's gonna give you more insights on um

407
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um on the device itself or the data that's on the device um the security of that of course there's

408
00:50:40,320 --> 00:50:48,480
also quirks like if you are able so let's say a company wouldn't accept your submission because

409
00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:53,040
they don't accept rooted devices

410
00:50:53,440 --> 00:51:02,400
uh as part of the scope so they say that if you're able to extract solid information from the app or

411
00:51:02,400 --> 00:51:07,840
from the user or from the phone without having the phone to be without having a rooted phone

412
00:51:07,840 --> 00:51:14,320
then your submission is valid but there's also the situation when the where the manifest file

413
00:51:14,320 --> 00:51:21,200
allows backups so if you're able to um if you're dealing with a non-rooted device

414
00:51:21,760 --> 00:51:27,600
and you're able to backup the app move the backup onto another device

415
00:51:29,760 --> 00:51:35,600
the backup usually is going to include the data folder which is only accessible by root

416
00:51:36,880 --> 00:51:44,160
so when you're actually extracting the backup from a non-rooted device you're getting the

417
00:51:44,160 --> 00:51:50,480
information that's only available to the root so if there's sensitive information in there

418
00:51:51,200 --> 00:52:00,560
um that's a valid impactful finding and there are a lot of situations where the manifest

419
00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:09,120
allows where you can see the manifest that allow backup is set to true and that's a security issue

420
00:52:10,160 --> 00:52:18,080
okay for the context of bug bounty what how can back hunters use mobile apps to to get bounties

421
00:52:18,080 --> 00:52:25,040
is it mostly listening to the web traffic using the mobile app and maybe the app uses some apis

422
00:52:25,040 --> 00:52:32,160
that the web application doesn't use or is there also a lot of like mobile attack surface that

423
00:52:32,160 --> 00:52:42,640
that is severe enough for a bounty finding okay so yeah there is um there is mobile attack surface

424
00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:49,200
that's not readily available readily available to most testers because that attack surface often

425
00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:58,160
involves coding your own uh exploit app for example to exploit intents to exploit components

426
00:52:58,160 --> 00:53:08,320
of the android system that would actually um compromise the application um ecosystem itself

427
00:53:08,320 --> 00:53:14,000
so if you're able to actually trigger something in the app from another app due to

428
00:53:18,080 --> 00:53:24,960
not well configured permissions due to bad intent uh that's something that's not readily

429
00:53:24,960 --> 00:53:30,720
available readily available to most pen testers but or most bug bounty hunters for example

430
00:53:31,680 --> 00:53:40,160
but yes of course listening to the traffic looking at the communication that's probably

431
00:53:40,160 --> 00:53:45,520
in the context of bug bounties that's probably where a lot of the findings are going to be even

432
00:53:45,520 --> 00:53:54,800
if it's a little bit um not easy to set up once you have set it up it actually it's quite convenient

433
00:53:54,800 --> 00:54:00,000
to look into the communication of course stuff that's on the device itself or stuff that

434
00:54:00,720 --> 00:54:05,200
most people can do with the click of a button like for example decompiling the app and looking

435
00:54:05,200 --> 00:54:15,280
for strings that's probably not gonna um you won't have good findings in programs and solid programs

436
00:54:15,280 --> 00:54:21,840
because most of them know that they shouldn't share their secret keys their api keys their

437
00:54:21,840 --> 00:54:28,000
credentials inside the apps most of them have already been found most of that stuff has already

438
00:54:28,000 --> 00:54:36,400
been found by pen testers usually companies with bug bounty programs with solid established bug

439
00:54:36,400 --> 00:54:48,320
bounty programs um have harder to find static related vulnerabilities when it comes to mobile

440
00:54:48,320 --> 00:54:55,360
apps so communication api the communication the traffic analyzing that is probably one of the best

441
00:54:55,360 --> 00:55:04,000
ways to go okay okay and uh in the context of of regular web website hacking web hacking web

442
00:55:04,000 --> 00:55:10,880
security uh how is your hacking style different when pentesting versus doing bug bounty

443
00:55:13,040 --> 00:55:20,080
well in pentesting it's much easier because in pentesting you often have the exclusivity

444
00:55:20,880 --> 00:55:30,240
um most often than not you have the exclusivity you have the first eyes first privy eyes first

445
00:55:30,240 --> 00:55:38,800
security oriented glasses on on the infrastructure itself so um you often find permissions where

446
00:55:39,600 --> 00:55:42,320
a normal user can do admin stuff

447
00:55:42,720 --> 00:55:53,520
and this is a common find in the pentests but in in bug bounties you have to you often have to look

448
00:55:53,520 --> 00:56:04,560
deeper especially if you're if you're hunting on programs um that a lot of hunters are all already

449
00:56:05,920 --> 00:56:09,360
hunting on as well like for example public programs or

450
00:56:09,920 --> 00:56:16,640
i think right now it's most mostly about uh private programs everybody everybody is invited

451
00:56:16,640 --> 00:56:23,680
to private programs but still in private programs uh from my experience i know that companies

452
00:56:24,320 --> 00:56:30,480
uh have already done their due diligence in their public programs because most of

453
00:56:31,680 --> 00:56:37,520
not most but a large portion of private programs they also have a public program

454
00:56:38,400 --> 00:56:45,440
the public program is often used as a funnel to get people into the um into the into the

455
00:56:45,440 --> 00:56:54,480
private programs as well um so not only that but also the fact that those companies have also had

456
00:56:54,480 --> 00:57:01,600
multiple rounds of pentests on their assets so it's not going to be as easy you have to have a

457
00:57:01,600 --> 00:57:06,320
you have to have a little bit different approach often involving going deeper

458
00:57:06,320 --> 00:57:15,280
going deeper into the functions going deeper into the uh features going deeper into permissions

459
00:57:16,800 --> 00:57:24,320
that's where the bread and butter is and of course looking into the business logic i think business

460
00:57:24,320 --> 00:57:36,400
logic is is um probably one of the best ways that you would go when you're competing with others

461
00:57:37,600 --> 00:57:43,600
okay that's a that's a good tip i like to think about pentesting versus bug bounty as

462
00:57:44,400 --> 00:57:49,840
short distance and long distance running like from the from the outside like both

463
00:57:50,560 --> 00:57:56,880
pentesters and bug bounty hunters hack web applications both marathon runners and

464
00:57:56,880 --> 00:58:02,480
sprinters run but in reality there are a lot of difference in in both of these activities

465
00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:08,400
and probably a person with better endurance will be better off in in long distance running

466
00:58:08,400 --> 00:58:15,120
a stronger taller person will be better for sprint and my question is what feature people

467
00:58:15,120 --> 00:58:20,560
with what features will feel better doing pentesting and people with what features will be

468
00:58:21,840 --> 00:58:23,920
better off in doing bug bounty hunting

469
00:58:28,160 --> 00:58:31,040
i'm not sure if i understand completely so

470
00:58:33,280 --> 00:58:40,480
you're actually asking what are the features that are actually most certain to get a to get you

471
00:58:40,480 --> 00:58:47,840
into a vulnerability so okay i will give you an example when bug bounty you don't have a boss

472
00:58:47,840 --> 00:58:53,920
so naturally people that are more more self-organized and can organize the type

473
00:58:53,920 --> 00:59:00,080
themselves they will do better in bug bounty a person that needs a boss will do better in

474
00:59:00,080 --> 00:59:08,960
pentesting that's that's one of the obvious things that so specifically for um specifically

475
00:59:08,960 --> 00:59:19,280
for features or specifically for for what exactly um because of course let's say that

476
00:59:19,280 --> 00:59:29,200
in pentest you have you also have as you said you can view this as a sprinter or a marathoner

477
00:59:29,760 --> 00:59:35,600
for example you often act as a sprinter in pentesting because you have a timeline

478
00:59:36,400 --> 00:59:44,000
and it's best if you can deliver something impactful in that timeline because even though

479
00:59:44,000 --> 00:59:53,200
some customers might actually be um on it just for the paperwork just for their uh compliance

480
00:59:53,200 --> 00:59:57,920
testing and they don't actually care about their findings there are a lot of companies that don't

481
00:59:57,920 --> 01:00:03,200
care about this their their pentesting findings you have to deliver something if you want that

482
01:00:03,600 --> 01:00:09,680
customer or that client to come back to you so it's it's it's a matter of time there now when

483
01:00:09,680 --> 01:00:17,120
it comes to of course when it comes to bug bounties um you have the luxury of doing

484
01:00:18,320 --> 01:00:23,280
doing it for how long you want but then there's also the component of losing motivation

485
01:00:24,160 --> 01:00:27,680
which is often the case so uh

486
01:00:30,080 --> 01:00:34,800
in the context of bug bounties you probably have to

487
01:00:36,800 --> 01:00:46,960
think try to think a little bit differently than everybody else because as bad as it sounds

488
01:00:47,920 --> 01:00:54,160
there's a tendency there's a group think not only in cyber security in pentesting in bug bounty

489
01:00:54,160 --> 01:00:59,360
hunting but in most of the fields there's this concept of group think group think everybody

490
01:00:59,360 --> 01:01:07,600
using the same tools the same tactics the same one-liners so in bug bounties you have to if you

491
01:01:07,680 --> 01:01:11,760
go slightly differently chances are that

492
01:01:15,040 --> 01:01:20,720
you're going to find something yeah yeah that's a good one i'm not sure if this answers your

493
01:01:20,720 --> 01:01:32,320
question yeah okay we'll be we'll be uh we're closing into to the end of our interview so

494
01:01:32,320 --> 01:01:36,400
but let's talk before we end about some non-technical stuff because i saw on twitter

495
01:01:36,400 --> 01:01:46,000
you have an amazingly impressive streak of 1100 days on Duolingo how on earth do you keep this up

496
01:01:46,000 --> 01:01:58,480
for so long um well it's simple i mean it's on my to-do list for every day so that's that's one of

497
01:01:58,480 --> 01:02:04,000
the things that's one of the streaks that i have to take care of every day and there are days when

498
01:02:04,000 --> 01:02:11,040
i just do the streak do the the work that counts for the streak and there are other days when i

499
01:02:11,040 --> 01:02:19,360
have more time and spend more time on the platform um it's i think it all boils down to consistency

500
01:02:20,400 --> 01:02:26,160
consistency you can ensure consistency by having

501
01:02:26,400 --> 01:02:34,560
checks for example in this case a simple checklist maintains the consistency

502
01:02:35,600 --> 01:02:44,240
a very simple to-do list today i must do Duolingo brilliant try hack me web security academy

503
01:02:44,240 --> 01:02:50,160
for whatever amount of time through time doing this for two or three weeks or one month

504
01:02:50,160 --> 01:03:00,560
i can understand how long does it take me to actually do these in a in any given day and then

505
01:03:00,560 --> 01:03:06,560
adapt accordingly whether or not i want to focus more on one than to another so it's just

506
01:03:07,520 --> 01:03:14,320
simple checklist it's a matter of checklist to maintain consistency and of course as you see

507
01:03:14,320 --> 01:03:20,480
results through time you're going to be more motivated to to maintain that consistency or

508
01:03:20,480 --> 01:03:28,400
streak in this case and now it would be really painful to break this streak well sometimes the

509
01:03:28,400 --> 01:03:36,000
the apps are actually make it easier for you to lose a day for example if i lose a day on Duolingo

510
01:03:36,000 --> 01:03:42,000
i'm not actually gonna lose everything because they have streak freeze so you can lose your

511
01:03:42,000 --> 01:03:49,760
streak for two or three or four and in my case right now for five days in a row and they're

512
01:03:49,760 --> 01:03:57,360
actually going to maintain my streak due to my five-day streak freeze but there are situations

513
01:03:57,360 --> 01:04:04,800
where that's not the case like for example when it comes to the kindle with reading yeah if you

514
01:04:04,800 --> 01:04:12,320
lose your your streak it's hard to actually get it back it's possible but it's hard i think that

515
01:04:12,320 --> 01:04:19,920
trihag me also has a let's you lose your streak for one day or something okay okay this one i

516
01:04:19,920 --> 01:04:25,440
didn't know do you always do these habits at a particular time of the day or do you group them

517
01:04:25,440 --> 01:04:36,000
together or how does it look like uh yeah so if i look back in the recent past i i can see that

518
01:04:36,560 --> 01:04:45,360
i i usually do them in the first part of the day so up until noon i actually do trihag me

519
01:04:46,320 --> 01:04:56,640
then i also do upon waking i think i do duolingo and brilliant and the reading in the second part

520
01:04:56,640 --> 01:05:02,880
of the day first off i'm doing the reading i have to read a couple of pages on kindle just to get

521
01:05:03,040 --> 01:05:16,320
streak and the streak uh is um is better if you if i read on kindle at 9 a.m chances are that

522
01:05:16,320 --> 01:05:25,920
they're not going to count that day for me because i think their timer is their base time is in san

523
01:05:25,920 --> 01:05:34,960
francisco or in la where my 9 a.m is the previous day there so i have to make sure that i read later

524
01:05:34,960 --> 01:05:40,880
in the day so that i have the streak that's interesting and this is actually i've seen this

525
01:05:40,880 --> 01:05:47,040
through trials and errors for example through losing my streak okay what happens when you have

526
01:05:47,040 --> 01:05:52,000
a really bad day like i don't know a hangover you're really tired you don't feel like doing

527
01:05:52,000 --> 01:06:03,360
anything how do you keep those habits then um well first off luckily thank god i didn't have

528
01:06:04,160 --> 01:06:09,200
a bad day in a long time i didn't have a hangover

529
01:06:11,520 --> 01:06:19,040
i don't know how many years it's been okay i do drink alcohol like very infrequently

530
01:06:19,040 --> 01:06:26,160
extremely infrequently have a glass or two of wine but when i have a bad day for example due to

531
01:06:26,160 --> 01:06:36,400
other reasons it's not taking me long to do my work for the day in an hour i can do all the

532
01:06:36,400 --> 01:06:47,120
necessaries that i have to do in the day and whatever else is after that it's optional so i

533
01:06:47,120 --> 01:06:58,240
can just take in the bad day as it is or try to fight it and actually try to win over it because

534
01:06:58,240 --> 01:07:08,240
it often happens that you have a bad day starting but with efficient struggle you can get over it

535
01:07:08,240 --> 01:07:18,320
and win win the day by the end of the day this this can happen as well okay okay that's great

536
01:07:18,320 --> 01:07:22,720
and my final question is what are you looking forward to achieve in 2024

537
01:07:25,120 --> 01:07:34,960
2024 depends i mean i actually depends on what area of life because it's not all about

538
01:07:35,120 --> 01:07:46,000
i try to pursue objectives in all areas of my life when it comes to career when it comes to

539
01:07:46,000 --> 01:07:52,240
relationships when it comes to health when it comes to emotional well-being for example

540
01:07:52,880 --> 01:08:01,440
so if we're strictly speaking about career wise expertise wise cyber security oriented

541
01:08:02,400 --> 01:08:08,160
i want to at least achieve the performance of this year which has been

542
01:08:11,200 --> 01:08:18,720
it's going to be hard to beat so it's going to be hard to what my personal performance this

543
01:08:18,720 --> 01:08:28,320
year is going to be hard to beat so hopefully i can if i get to 70 of it

544
01:08:28,560 --> 01:08:35,680
i'm going to say okay it was a good year but my goal is to go over it so i'm shooting for

545
01:08:35,680 --> 01:08:42,880
going over my performance in terms of in terms of first off the quality and the number of pen tests

546
01:08:42,880 --> 01:08:52,240
the number of clients that i have so my focus is going to be specifically on numbers here and

547
01:08:52,320 --> 01:09:00,160
specifically on numbers here and numbers plus the quality and this also has to do with my level of

548
01:09:00,160 --> 01:09:07,360
expertise and i'm actually going to try to get better into some areas that i see that i'm most

549
01:09:07,360 --> 01:09:14,400
interested in such as authorization authentication broken access controls these are my favorites but

550
01:09:14,400 --> 01:09:20,720
when when you're dealing with the pen test you have to include everything that has so you're

551
01:09:20,720 --> 01:09:27,760
testing but through a methodology i cannot just deliver authorization issues to a pen test

552
01:09:27,760 --> 01:09:34,480
because that that's against the methodology i'm testing against oasp top 10 usually if you're

553
01:09:34,480 --> 01:09:40,400
dealing with mobile with uh with banking applications with fintech stuff you're also

554
01:09:40,400 --> 01:09:48,240
using other methodologies but um where actually i don't want to diverge too much from the main

555
01:09:48,240 --> 01:09:57,440
subject so i want to get better in terms of my expertise so that i can maybe get more clients

556
01:09:58,720 --> 01:10:05,360
and do as many pen tests this is strictly speaking for pentest when it comes to bug bounty hunting

557
01:10:06,320 --> 01:10:13,440
i think i i'm taking this i want to keep focusing on the same program

558
01:10:14,400 --> 01:10:22,160
and actually try to become specialized in um

559
01:10:24,400 --> 01:10:30,880
in the area that that company actually operates so okay i don't want to be

560
01:10:32,240 --> 01:10:37,760
um i know what i don't want to be i don't want to be shooting for the leaderboards

561
01:10:38,080 --> 01:10:43,600
i don't want to be in the top 10 i want to actually become very good at one thing

562
01:10:45,520 --> 01:10:50,560
specifically in this case for that program and if i get interest in other programs but

563
01:10:50,560 --> 01:11:00,000
but i i saw that if i focus on one program alone i can find vulnerabilities that their team of

564
01:11:00,000 --> 01:11:08,640
dozens of security engineers didn't find in the years their assets are on so that that's a very

565
01:11:08,640 --> 01:11:14,960
strong point for me that that's a very strong motivator for me if i can find stuff that their

566
01:11:14,960 --> 01:11:22,400
teams of security engineers didn't find i'm all in for that yeah yeah that's a good one that's a

567
01:11:22,400 --> 01:11:27,920
very good one and also if you're aiming for 70 of what you achieved this year it means you had a

568
01:11:27,920 --> 01:11:33,280
really really good year so congratulations on that and thank you so much for for joining me in

569
01:11:33,280 --> 01:11:38,800
today's chat uh if viewers are interested in following you for more stuff where do they go

570
01:11:40,320 --> 01:11:50,560
on twitter you are on twitter christie vlad 25 christie vlad 25 okay that's perfect we will also

571
01:11:50,560 --> 01:11:57,440
link this down in the description and once again thank you so much for joining me today thank you

572
01:11:57,440 --> 01:12:05,360
brian thank you for listening to this episode if you're hungry for more i recommend you this one

573
01:12:05,360 --> 01:12:12,560
with shops about source code review which is helpful both for pentesting and for bug bounty


